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Carbon Intensity Standards: A Distraction and a Danger to 
Real Action on Climate Change 
Andrew Greene* 
I. Introduction
It is only a matter of time, if not during the 111th Congress then 
certainly within the next presidential term, before Congress passes major 
legislation addressing climate change.  Public perception about the scale of 
the problem and the need for commensurate action has shifted 
momentously while legislators, business leaders and environmentalists 
have collaborated on a multitude of proposals without achieving a 
consensus.  Proposals have ranged from imposing a carbon tax to promoting 
voluntary conservation.  However, the approach that has gained the most 
traction so far is implementing an absolute cap on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and allowing major emitters to trade allowances according to 
their needs.  Similar cap-and-trade programs have already been introduced 
around the world and in regions of the U.S.  The popularity of these policies 
stems from their efficiency – the costs of complying with a cap are lowered 
because market forces ensure that reductions occur wherever they can be 
made most cheaply.  This approach is contained in Senate Bill 2191, 
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner, titled America’s Climate 
Security Act of 2007. 
Fearing that this means of addressing climate change would put U.S. 
producers of energy-intensive products at a competitive disadvantage, the 
steel industry, as represented by the American Iron and Steel Institute and 
Nucor Steel, has presented an alternative proposal – establishing “carbon 
intensity standards,” or limits on the amount of CO2 emissions allowed in 
the production of certain products.  Carbon intensity is a ratio of the amount 
of carbon released into the atmosphere per unit of production or amount of 
economic value created.1  The steel industry’s idea is to apply performance 
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standards that U.S. producers could easily meet to both domestically 
produced and imported goods.  Goods produced less efficiently than the 
standards demanded would be banned from the U.S. market.  This approach, 
say its advocates, would lower emissions worldwide without harming U.S. 
industry the way a cap-and-trade system would.  As the merits of each 
proposal have been debated in congressional hearings, it has also been 
suggested that carbon intensity standards could complement a national 
cap-and-trade program. 
This article argues that carbon intensity standards represent a 
diversion on the path to the low-carbon economy of the future.  Indeed, in 
addition to being extremely vulnerable to an attack in the WTO, they 
discourage the kind of global cooperation that is needed to address climate 
change seriously.  This most recent reincarnation of energy intensity 
standards is eerily reminiscent of the Bush administration’s pledge, made 
shortly after the President announced that the U.S. did not intend to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol, to combat climate change by setting voluntary targets 
for energy intensity that would likely be met while continuing to conduct 
business as usual.2  Not only did U.S. GHG emissions continue to increase 
at a steady rate under this policy, but the approach exemplifies the profound 
unwillingness of the U.S. to provide genuine leadership on what many 
believe to be the most important issue of our time and the ways in which 
U.S. approaches to the problem are out of step with the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, carbon intensity standards in this context represent the type of 
unilateralism that has already earned the U.S. disapproval from the WTO.3 
Part II of this article provides a brief overview on the difficulties of 
instigating international action on this issue and the disincentives for 
nations to act independently.  Part III describes key features of the 
Lieberman-Warner bill, which had already been reported out of the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works when the last Congress 
adjourned.  Elements of the proposal are then analyzed under the general 
provisions of the GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement), as well as under Article XX, the environmental exceptions 
provision of the GATT.  Additionally, the broader policy implications of this 
1. Timothy Herzog, Kevin B. Baumert & Jonathan Pershing, Word Resources
Institute, TARGET: INTENSITY: AN ANALYSIS OF GREENHOUSE GAS INTENSITY TARGETS 3 (2006). 
2. Id. at 12.  Energy intensity in developed countries (based on GDP) tends to
decline over time.  This is due in part to more stringent environmental controls, but 
also to shifts in the economy which result in greater wealth creation with lower 
emissions, e.g., from manufacturing to computer services.  Bush’s goal of reducing 
intensity by 18 percent from 2002 to 2012 mirrored the 17-percent reduction that had 
occurred between 1990 and 2002.  Id. at 7.  
3. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 186, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp]. 
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approach are evaluated.  Part IV first discusses features of the carbon 
intensity standards approach.  After briefly addressing why such an 
approach contravenes the general provisions of the GATT, it goes on to 
analyze the claim that this proposal is consistent with the TBT Agreement4 
and to evaluate whether carbon intensity standards could be justified under 
Article XX.  The broader limitations of this policy are discussed as well.  Part 
V elaborates on some additional considerations that would make a cap-and-
trade program successful, including ways to solidify the U.S. position should 
the program be challenged in a WTO dispute and to decrease the costs to 
U.S. producers while increasing the environmental benefits to the planet. 
This article concludes with a sort of eulogy to carbon intensity standards, in 
the hopes that the U.S. will put to rest an arbitrary and patently self-serving 
approach that has tended to animate only policymakers averse to taking real 
action on climate change while garnering minimal support from 
environmentalists and the international community. 
II. Free Trade and Climate Change – International Approaches
Climate change has been called the greatest and widest ranging 
market failure ever seen.5  Though economists continue to debate the extent 
to which greater trade over the last few decades has increased or 
redistributed wealth,6 few observers doubt that it has raised the specter of 
environmental problems on a scale never before witnessed by humankind. 
Thus far, international bodies have had limited success at assuaging 
concerns that protecting the environment and promoting trade are 
incompatible goals, or that countries can cooperate to restrain 
anthropogenic contributions to climate change as effectively as they have to 
promote freer trade.  That the U.S. has been unwilling to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol exacerbates these concerns, but even those countries that have 
4. See Climate Change: Competitiveness Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing
Countries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of James Slattery, Counsel, American 
Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), Steel Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Hearing].  
5. Nicholas Stern, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 
6. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INTL. L. 285, 303 (2003) (“The political reality in the 
United States makes it unlikely that the winners will be taxed to compensate the 
losers.”); Jeff Faux, How NAFTA Failed Mexico: Immigration is Not a Development Policy, AM.
PROSPECT, July-Aug. 2003, at 35, 37. 
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begun reductions under Kyoto have not made the degree of progress that 
scientists say is necessary to avert global disaster.7  
The first international treaty to address climate change was the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, entered into force in 
1994. The UNFCCC obligated signatory nations to take action to combat 
climate change, but it did not set specific targets on emissions or prescribe 
a particular approach to reducing them.8  After President George H.W. Bush 
signed the treaty, the Senate gave its advice and consent on October 7, 
1992.9  Meetings among the signatory nations, known as Conventions of the 
Parties (COPs), led to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, which did impose 
specific caps on developed nations.10  Though the U.S. initially signed the 
Protocol, the Senate later passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by 95-0, 
indicating that it would not ratify a treaty that did not impose caps on 
developing countries.11  The treaty was never submitted to Congress, and 
7. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, 62 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
8. It has been suggested that under the UNFCCC other nations could
successfully challenge the U.S. for its lack of action on climate change.  See Liana G.T. 
Wolf, Note, Countervailing a Hidden Subsidy: The U.S. Failure to Require Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reductions, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 115 (2006) (arguing that “the failure 
of the United States to impose the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions on 
its energy intensive industries should be classified as a hidden subsidy subject to 
countervailing duties” under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures).  Once the U.S. has taken some action on the issue, however, such claims 
are weakened considerably.  Indeed, the Lieberman-Warner proposal includes a 
“Statement of Policy” declaring, “It is the policy of the United States to work 
proactively under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and, in other 
appropriate forums, to establish binding agreements committing all major 
greenhouse gas-emitting nations to contribute equitably to the reduction of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.”  America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th 
Cong. § 6002(b)(1) (2007). 
9. David M. Ackerman, Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions About the
Kyoto Protocol, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. DOC. No. 98-349, at 1 (2002). 
10. See Charles Hanley, U.N. Scientist Urges U.S. to Cut Emissions, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2007, at A17.  Kyoto required industrialized countries to reduce 
their emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. 
11. The resolution, though not legally binding, deterred President Clinton from
ever submitting the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification.  Specifically, the 
resolution stated: 
the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other 
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or 
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though there is no procedure by which the U.S. can remove its signature 
from the Protocol, President George W. Bush later announced that his 
administration did not intend to pursue ratification.12  
Since then the U.S. has pursued a policy of lax emissions reduction 
targets and voluntary action.  In 2006, it helped form the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP).13  This international 
body was created to facilitate the sharing of environmental technologies 
between its partner members.  Similarly, an agreement by the G-8 nations to 
improve technology sharing, the Gleneagles Plan of Action, iterates a policy 
of voluntary action in the interest of energy efficiency.14  At best, such 
policies have achieved a modicum of progress on climate change, at worst 
they have undermined more serious efforts undertaken pursuant to the 
goals of the UNFCCC by obfuscating the need for more meaningful 
international commitments.  Some commentators have suggested that 
efforts such as the Gleneagles Plan divert momentum from working within 
the Kyoto framework.15  But regardless of the intent behind the Gleneagles 
Plan and the APP, it appears that most of the world is committed to a 
mandatory framework, at least for developed nations.  At the 2007 COP in 
Bali, the parties pressed for a successor treaty to Kyoto and encouraged the 
U.S. to get on board or to get out of the way.16  It has become apparent to 
thereafter, which would – (A) mandate new commitments to limit or 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the 
protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would result in 
serious harm to the economy of the United States. 
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
12. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 2-3.
13. The APP Charter states that one of the Partnership’s goals is to “[c]reate a
voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate 
the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and 
longer term cost-effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among 
the Partners through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical 
results.”  Available at http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/charter.pdf. 
14. The Gleneagles Plan of Action lays out “forward actions” countries can take
in the areas of energy use, research and development and monitoring illegal logging, 
without imposing specific obligations on any country. 
15. See, e.g., Robert Novak, Bush Withstands G-8 Heat on Kyoto, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
July 14, 2005, at 43. 
16. Climate Change Conference Plants Small Seed; Industry Will Be Better Equipped to Deal
with New Regulations Following Bali Meeting, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 22, 2007, at D13 
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many that the U.S. has stayed out of the game long enough and that 
because the costs of dealing with climate change could double if action is 
delayed even two years,17 the time to act is now. 
Most policymakers understand that the only effective solution to this 
global issue is global cooperation.  Problems with free-riders and leakage 
make it difficult, if not foolhardy, for individual nations to address climate 
change on their own.18  If the U.S. acted alone, for instance, all countries 
would receive at least a theoretical benefit from U.S. reductions in GHG 
emissions, whether or not they made any sacrifices or reductions of their 
own.  Although U.S. historical emissions far surpass those of any other 
country, the prospect of paying dearly to confer a benefit on the rest of the 
world jars U.S. voters and policymakers, as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 
clearly indicates.  Moreover, the leakage problem ensures that such 
benevolence would be futile.  Because production tends to migrate to where 
the regulations are the weakest, well-intentioned domestic efforts may 
produce the unintended consequence of moving manufacturing jobs outside 
the country, where lax environmental controls result in greater amounts of 
GHG emissions to produce the same output. 
The unopposed passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution indicates how 
firmly U.S. politicians oppose taking action in the absence of action by 
developing countries.  Internationally, the U.S. has relinquished its 
leadership role in this area by waiting for countries such as China and India 
to make commitments to reducing GHG emissions.19  Domestically, it has 
impeded efforts by states that are eager to begin taking action now.20  But as 
the rising costs of delay become increasingly apparent, using the developing 
world’s inaction as an excuse for further delay makes less sense every day. 
In addition, as developing countries become more receptive to some 
(stating that while the parties were not able to draft an agreement, they committed 
to completing one by 2009). 
17. International Aspects of a Cap and Trade Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp, Senior Counsel, 
Environmental Defense Fund). 
18. See Laura Thoms, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone and
Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 795, 798-99 
(2003) (discussing how the global nature of the climate change coupled with “tragedy 
of the commons” problems creates incentives for free riding and uncertainty about 
whether parties will keep whatever commitments they make). 
19. Though initially they too resisted the Kyoto Protocol, Australia and Canada
ratified it in December 2007.  See Peter N. Spotts, Bali Climate Deal Sparks a Geopolitical 
Shift, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1. 
20. Individual states have successfully sued to force the federal government to
regulate CO
2
 emissions as it is required to do by the Clean Air Act.  See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
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restrictions on their GHG emissions, this excuse for procrastination by the 
U.S. may soon expire. 
At long last, concern in the U.S. about climate change has reached the 
level where legislators have begun to agree on the need for genuine action. 
After years of efforts designed to create the illusion that the U.S. is taking 
action through voluntary reductions and energy intensity pledges, U.S. 
legislators are turning to mandated emissions restrictions and market-based 
solutions.  Proposals have been made ranging from the command-and-
control variety to the imposition of a tax on carbon,21 but the approach most 
likely to garner the necessary political support is a cap-and-trade program. 
U.S. industry groups, perhaps attempting to postpone any change in the 
status quo or perhaps recognizing that some mandatory regulation is 
inevitable, are weighing in on how such a program could be implemented 
without adversely affecting their interests.  Recent legislative hearings have 
focused on three main issues: (1) how the U.S. can encourage developing 
countries to participate in reducing their emissions, (2) how U.S. industries 
can remain on a level playing field with businesses in countries without 
emissions caps, and (3) how a program can be structured and implemented 
so that it will not violate the GATT or draw retaliatory action from U.S. 
trading partners.22  
Despite a broad and growing consensus that action needs to be taken, 
considerable disagreements remain on how best to meet these objectives. 
Unlike negotiating trade agreements which promise that the benefits will 
outweigh the costs for all parties involved,23 reducing GHG emissions will 
have an economic cost for all parties as environmental costs are 
internalized.24  Though the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) estimates the cost of meaningfully addressing climate change at less 
than three percent of world GDP in 2030, the crucial question is how those 
costs will be divided equitably and efficiently.25  An allowance trading system 
21. See John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem
and a Taxing Solution, 76 IND. L.J. 829 (2001) (analyzing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these approaches from a policy standpoint). 
22. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
23. See generally, Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental
Measures Under Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 120-21 (2007) 
(discussing how the economic models developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
support the proposition that international trade is a positive sum game).  
24. Some have suggested that shifting to a low-carbon economy will be a net
gain for the U.S.; however, this argument has yet to persuade a critical mass of 
policymakers.  See, e.g., Eric Shaffner, Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting 
Out the Kyoto Protocol to Its Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL. L. 441 (2007). 
25. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 69.
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minimizes the cost of complying with an imposed cap, despite some 
administrative costs and the potential for volatility in the price of 
allowances.  However, energy-intensive industries in the U.S. perceive any 
additional cost as putting them at a competitive disadvantage with 
importers who are not subject to the same restrictions as they are.  This has 
been the basis for industry and labor’s usual opposition to national 
proposals to address climate change and the reason why climate change 
negotiations have stalled since Byrd-Hagel. 
III. Cap-and-Trade Under the Lieberman-Warner Proposal
Senate Bill 2191 appears to offer a way past this traditional confluence 
of opposition.  As the approach that has garnered the most political support 
so far, it portends what U.S. climate change legislation will probably look 
like.  Even the American Electric Power Company and the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers now support creating a domestic cap-and-
trade program that would require importers to submit “international reserve 
allowances” equivalent in value to the permits domestic producers had to 
buy under the program.  Countries that took “comparable action” on 
reducing GHG emissions would be exempt from the allowance requirement. 
Thus, the real aspiration behind this approach is that it will prompt 
developing countries to take action, obviating the need to assess the 
allowances.  However, some lawmakers have pointed out that resistance 
from other countries is likely to be quite strong.26  In addition, whether 
importers adopt more stringent environmental standards or pass on the 
costs of allowances to consumers, U.S. consumers and importers of raw 
materials will in any event face higher prices.  Though this approach has its 
complexities and is likely to be challenged in a WTO proceeding, legislators 
are hoping that it never reaches the crucible of a WTO panel – that the pull 
of the U.S. market and the push of international opinion will encourage 
developing countries that are major emitters to adopt a comparable 
emissions regime well before any type of trade sanction gets assessed or 
imposed.  
This bold strategy carries risks.  There is the possibility that affected 
countries will impose retaliatory tariffs or other trade measures that could 
trigger a trade war.27  Of course, there is no absolute certainty how a WTO 
panel will rule in such a situation.  Thus, it is important to understand where 
such proposals could run afoul of U.S. obligations under the WTO for two 
26. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery) (suggesting that just as
the U.S. has been unable to persuade China on the issue of currency reform, it could 
not persuade China to adopt GHG emissions measures by requiring international 
reserve allowances). 
27. Green Protectionism, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2007, at 58.
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reasons: To make the sanction of having to purchase allowances more 
credible, and to provide a firm foundation for protecting U.S. interests in a 
WTO proceeding, should it have to defend itself before a Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) or challenge another country’s retaliatory action as inconsistent 
with the GATT. 
A. International Reserve Allowances
To stabilize the playing field for domestic energy-intensive industries, 
importers would be required to purchase allowances similar to the ones U.S. 
producers would purchase under a cap-and-trade program.28  These would 
be assessed solely on energy-intensive imports such as steel, aluminum, 
cement, glass, and paper.29  Energy-intensive imports from countries that 
take comparable action on restricting GHGs would be exempt from having to 
be accompanied by allowances.  In addition, imports from countries 
emitting less than 0.5 percent of global GHG emissions would be exempt.30  
Title VI of the bill would allow the President to make an assessment of 
whether measures adopted in a particular country were “comparable in 
effect to actions carried out by the United States” to limit GHGs,31 while the 
Administrator would be required to determine a baseline emission level for 
each importing country as well as the price of allowances.32  Under the latest 
version of the bill, emissions for U.S. producers would be capped beginning 
in 2012, the fee amounts would be determined beginning in 2019 and 
importers from countries that have not taken comparable action would be 
charged beginning in 2020.  Ideally, this would encourage other countries 
with large emissions of GHGs to implement a cap or regulate their energy-
intensive industries within the near future.  The eight-year delay may also 
facilitate WTO compliance.  However, industry advocates support reducing 
the delay to as short as possible so as not to disadvantage U.S. producers in 
the short term.  
28. The proposal co-authored by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers and American Electric (IBEW-AEP proposal) would apply to products such 
as iron, steel, aluminum, cement, glass and paper.  Rosalie Westenskow, Trade Worries 
Tangle CO
2
 Plan, UPI ENERGY, Mar. 10, 2008, at 1. 
29. Developing Countries Singled Out As Growing Climate Issue, CONGRESS DAILY, Mar.
6, 2008, at 1. 
30. America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 6006(b)
(2007) [hereinafter Climate Security Act].  
31. Id. § 6001(2).
32. Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at §§ 6001(1), 6006(a).
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B. General Provisions of the GATT
The goal of free trade is to eliminate restrictions on trade so that each 
country concentrates its production where it has a comparative advantage.33  
Thus, a guiding principle of the GATT is that “like products” are not 
discriminated against in international trade, regardless of the policy reasons 
for distinguishing between them.  This core requirement poses a formidable 
obstacle to justifying international reserve allowances under both the 
national treatment and most-favored nation (MFN) provisions of the treaty. 
1. National Treatment
National treatment is a primary obligation under the WTO – imports 
from other Members are to be treated the same as the domestic products 
with which they compete.  Taxes, regulations and other measures “should 
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection 
to domestic production.”34  Moreover, Article III:2 states that imports “shall 
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products.”  In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body laid 
out a two-part test for determining whether an internal measure violates 
Article III:2: “first, whether the taxed imported and domestic products are 
‘like’ and, second, whether the taxes applied to the imported products are ‘in 
excess of’ those applied to the like domestic products.”35  
Under Title VI of the Lieberman-Warner proposal, a “covered good” is 
an imported primary product that results in a substantial quantity of GHG 
emissions and is “closely related” to a U.S. good that is more costly to 
produce under the U.S. cap-and-trade regime.36  There is little doubt that any 
“closely related” good under Lieberman-Warner would meet the definition of 
a “directly competitive or substitutable” product within the meaning of the 
second sentence of Article III:2.  Such imports might even be considered 
“like” domestic products within the meaning of the first prong of the Article 
III:2 test laid out in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, even though the meaning of 
“like products” is construed narrowly there.37  Under either standard, if an 
import were not “directly competitive” with or “like” a domestic product, 
33. See Ghei, supra note 23, at 123.
34. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III:1, Oct. 31, 1947 [hereinafter GATT]. 
35. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II), at 17-18, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II]. 
36. Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at § 6001(5).
37. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 35, at 20.
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there would be no basis for requiring international reserve allowances in the 
first place.  
The key issue then is whether the allowance requirement would 
impose a charge on imports “in excess of” the cost to U.S. producers.  The 
complaining party would bear the burden of proving that the price of 
allowances exceeded the cost U.S. producers had to pay.38  Any excess at all 
would be deemed a violation of the GATT, as “[e]ven the smallest amount of 
‘excess’ is too much.  ‘The prohibition of discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, 
first sentence, is not conditional on a “trade effects test” nor is it qualified by 
a de minimis standard.’”39  Furthermore, in Indonesia – Autos, the Panel found 
that tax differences based on national origin are inherently inconsistent with 
Article III:2, even if they result in an overall balance of less favorable 
treatment and more favorable treatment that is not in excess of the overall 
cost to domestic producers.40  Finally, the form of an internal charge and the 
policy purposes behind it are irrelevant for Article III:2 purposes.41 
Given the strict standard which applies to excess costs, a DSB would 
likely scrutinize the cost of allowances closely.  Because any added cost for 
importers would be inconsistent with Article III:2, the allowance requirement 
could lead to litigious wrangling over the appropriate price of allowances. 
The requirement mandates that the Administrator does not err on the side 
of over-charging importers for allowances.  Importing Members could also 
argue that because the allowance requirement is based on the national 
origin of the products, if the price of allowances as to a single product is 
greater than the corresponding domestic costs, the entire scheme violates 
the GATT, as “averaging” is not permitted under WTO precedent.  Lastly, the 
laudable goal of reducing GHG emissions would not save the allowance 
requirement if it were found to result in any less favorable treatment toward 
imports.42  Thus, though the burden would be on the Member challenging 
the allowance requirement, there are numerous pathways to demonstrate 
that the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2. 
38. Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 6.14, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/R
(July 11, 1996). 
39. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 35, at 24.
40. Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry
(Indonesia – Autos), ¶ 14.112, WT/DS54, 55, 59 & 64/R (July 2, 1998). 
41. Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina – Hides and Leather), ¶ 11.144, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000). 
42. Id. Under the chapeau of Article XX, measures do not have to meet this high
standard.  See infra Part III.D. 
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2. MFN
Article I:1 states that “any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originated in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.”43  In other words, the GATT requires Members to treat 
one another’s like products equally.  Under Lieberman-Warner, some 
countries presumably would not have to purchase allowances because they 
had enacted comparable domestic measures to address GHG emissions 
while others would because the President would have determined that they 
had not enacted such measures.  This would constitute an advantage to 
some Members that is not accorded “immediately and unconditionally to 
the like product” from another Member.  Supporters of international reserve 
allowances argue that because the U.S. would be imposing roughly the same 
regulatory requirements on each country, such requirements are consistent 
with the GATT.  However, even though the proposal allows both the 
President and the Administrator a substantial amount of discretion in 
determining whether to require allowances and how much they will cost, the 
unequivocal language in Article I indicates that this discretion would still be 
bound by the general principles of the GATT. 
Furthermore, by crafting obligations which focus on the products 
themselves, the WTO eschews infringing upon the sovereignty of its 
Members and attempts to maintain a sense of objectivity with regard to 
internationally traded goods.  Though the WTO has not categorically 
rejected production and process measures (PPMs) as a legitimate means for 
distinguishing between what would otherwise be considered “like products,” 
the language of the GATT does not support such an approach under either 
its national treatment or most-favored nation provisions.  Requiring 
importers to tender international reserve allowances would probably be 
found to conflict with the MFN requirement for two reasons.  First, it is clear 
that the energy-intensive goods at issue, e.g., concrete, glass and steel, are 
“like products” within the meaning of the MFN provision, just as they are for 
national treatment purposes.  Second, because “customs duties and charges 
of any kind” trigger MFN treatment, requiring countries to submit 
allowances purchased from the U.S. government is likely to be found illegal. 
In short, the allowance requirement is likely to violate MFN and national 
treatment obligations in the GATT.  If international reserve allowances are 
not consistent with the general provisions of the GATT, a dispute brought by 
another Member would probably hinge upon whether the program could be 
justified under the TBT Agreement or the exceptions listed in Article XX. 
43. GATT, supra note 34, art. I:1.
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C. TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement delineates exceptions to the general WTO rules – 
an express acknowledgement by its Members that technical regulations and 
standards can facilitate international trade.44  Under the TBT Agreement, 
Members may impose technical regulations to fulfill legitimate objectives as 
long as they do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade and 
are not more trade-restrictive than necessary.45  In addition, regulations 
must comply with Article 2.1, which reiterates the theme of non-
discrimination found throughout the GATT.46  
A Member seeking to challenge the international reserve allowances 
requirement under the TBT Agreement would first have to show that it was 
part of a “technical regulation,” bringing the measure within the purview of 
the TBT Agreement.  Then the challenging Member would have to show that 
the measure does not fulfill a “legitimate objective” or that it is “more trade-
restrictive than necessary.”  If either of these conditions is met, the 
allowance requirement could not be justified under the TBT Agreement. 
Only one dispute, EC – Sardines, has required detailed analysis of the TBT 
Agreement, which suggests that novel interpretations by the U.S. of its 
provisions are likely to generate disputes and litigation. 
1. Technical Regulations
If a measure is not a “technical regulation,” it does not fall within the 
scope of the TBT Agreement.47  Annex 1, paragraph 1, of the Agreement 
defines a technical regulation as a “[d]ocument which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including 
the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is 
mandatory.”  This language creates three distinct requirements: (1) the 
document must apply to an identifiable product or group of products, (2) 
the document must lay down at least one characteristic of the product, and 
(3) compliance with the characteristic or characteristics must be
44. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement]; see generally Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of 
International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
45. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, at art. 2.2.
46. Article 2.1 mandates that imports “shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country.” 
47. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (EC
– Sardines), ¶ 175, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate EC – Sardines].
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mandatory.48  Finally, specific provisions of a regulation are not to be 
evaluated independently but rather “as an integrated whole.”49  
Currently, whether the allowance requirement would qualify as a 
technical regulation is uncertain.  First, though a product does not have to 
be expressly identified within a measure to be considered identifiable,50 the 
measure does have to provide other Members with notice as to which 
products are covered.51  Under the Lieberman-Warner bill, a “covered good” 
is a primary product that generates a substantial quantity of GHG emissions 
in the course of its manufacture and is closely related to a domestic good 
whose cost is affected by the cap-and-trade program.52  Even if this 
somewhat abstract language is held not to definitively identify the products 
at issue by a DSB, it would not be difficult for the Administrator to 
promulgate a more concrete list of affected products.  Thus, the “identifiable 
product” requirement will not pose an insurmountable obstacle to enforcing 
the Lieberman-Warner proposal as it is currently written. 
Second, the characteristics of the product do not have to be intrinsic 
to the product itself – they can be merely “related to it.”53  The relevant 
characteristics here would be that a product fits the above definition of a 
covered good and comes from a country that has not taken comparable 
action on reducing GHG emissions.  On the one hand, the concepts of 
“related processes and production methods” and “applicable administrative 
provisions” might be stretched to the breaking point if they encompassed a 
Member’s entire energy policy.  For instance, suppose the U.S. required 
allowances on China’s steel imports because it had not taken comparable 
action on reducing GHG emissions.  China could respond that even though 
it has imposed no regulations on the steel industry, it has taken other 
measures to reduce GHG emissions, such as rationing fuel for heating and 
transportation, or perhaps it has planted a new forest in Indonesia to offset 
its emissions.  Therefore, according to China, the allowance requirement is 
48. Id. ¶ 176.
49. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 64, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter Appellate EC – Asbestos].  In EC – Asbestos, Canada contended that 
French measures banning certain products containing asbestos fell within the scope 
of the TBT Agreement; the Appellate Body agreed, finding that the measure 
constituted a technical regulation when properly considered “as an integrated 
whole.”  Id.  That is, because the measure permitted some uses of asbestos, it was 
not a total prohibition – it contained permissive elements as well.  Id. 
50. Id. ¶ ¶ 180, 183.
51. Id. ¶ 185.
52. Climate Security Act, supra note 30.
53. EC – Asbestos, supra note 49, ¶ 89.
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not really about production methods or applicable administrative provisions 
but rather an attempt by the U.S. to hoist the burdens of its own broad 
policies onto another Member.  On the other hand, the terms “production 
methods” and “applicable administrative provisions” might cover a wide 
spectrum as they are not patently limited by the terms of the TBT 
Agreement.  Thus, a DSB could decide either way on this issue, and today 
the outcome can only be deduced by speculation. 
DSBs have not devoted much attention to the third element, and it is 
not necessary to do so here.  The allowances clearly would be mandatory for 
countries that do not take comparable action on climate change. 
Nonetheless, assuming a DSB concluded that the allowance requirement 
qualifies as a technical regulation, it does not necessarily follow that it 
would be upheld. 
2. Legitimate Objectives
Under the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation must serve a 
legitimate purpose.  The Preamble to the TBT Agreement recognizes the 
right of Members to take measures necessary “for the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, [or] of the environment.”  An inclusive list of 
“legitimate objectives” is found in Article 2.2, including “protection of human 
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”  The 
Agreement permits Members to consider the risks of non-fulfillment based 
on, inter alia, “available scientific and technical information, [or] related 
processing technology.”54  These provisions and the growing body of 
scientific data on climate change suggest that “legitimate objectives” would 
be construed broadly enough by a DSB to support the U.S. position in a 
dispute over international reserve allowances.  
3. Least Trade-Restrictive Manner
Finally, when a Member departs from a relevant international 
standard, it must do so in the least trade-restrictive manner so as not to 
create an unnecessary obstacle to trade.55  Article 2.5 states that regulations 
consistent with relevant international standards shall be presumed not to 
create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade, implying that 
regulations not in accordance with international standards will not be 
entitled to such a presumption.  Where relevant international standards 
exist, Members are required to use them “as the basis for” their own 
technical regulations, except that Members can depart from a relevant 
international standard if it is an “ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
54. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.2.
55. Id.
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fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.”56  The TBT Agreement does not 
expressly address regulations where there are no relevant international 
standards.  Therefore, the status of a technical regulation that serves a 
legitimate purpose could depend on (1) whether or not a relevant international 
standard exists, and if so, (2) whether that standard was used “as a basis for” the 
challenged regulation, and (3) whether that standard is effective and 
appropriate.  Also, how a DSB chooses to evaluate a Member’s regulation when 
there are no relevant international standards remains to be seen. 
a. Relevant International Standard
The term “standard” is defined in Annex 1, paragraph 2 of the TBT 
Agreement as a “[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that pro- 
vides . . . guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and 
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.” In EC – 
Sardines, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that a standard 
established by “a recognized body” does not have to be approved by 
consensus.57  Thus, a Member challenging the allowance requirement might 
assert that the relevant international standard is the Kyoto Protocol, which 
was created by a recognized body, the COP, to address GHG emissions, and 
which embodies the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities.”58  If a DSB accepted this argument, the complaining 
Member would still have to show that the U.S. departure from the relevant 
international standard (i.e., from common but differentiated responsibilities 
to comparable action) was not justified, even though the U.S. had never 
agreed to be bound by the Protocol.59  The remainder of the analysis in this 
subpart assumes a Kyoto-type agreement would provide a relevant 
international standard with which to contrast the allowance requirement.  
The possibility that a DSB would conclude that there is no relevant 
international standard in this context is discussed below in Part III.C.3.d. 
b. “As a Basis For”
If the Kyoto Protocol were found to provide a relevant international 
standard, an even murkier question is whether it would be used “as a basis 
for” the U.S. allowance requirement in accordance with Article 2.4.  Again, 
56. Id. art. 2.4.
57. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 227.
58. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 10, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
59. See Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 468-74 (2007) 
(analyzing on the role of non-WTO agreements in interpreting WTO agreements). 
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the burden would be on a challenging Member to show that that the 
relevant international standard had not been used as a basis for the 
allowance requirement.60  In EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body held that a 
technical regulation must not “contradict” a relevant international 
standard,61 but neither is a “rational relationship” between the regulation 
and the international standard required.62  Though there is plenty of room 
between these bookends, a challenging party could argue that the allowance 
requirement contradicts a fundamental principle of the Kyoto Protocol by 
placing a higher obligation on developing countries.  Conversely, the U.S. 
could argue that the allowance requirement is based on the subjective 
notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and that the regulation 
allows for a similar amount of discretion while seeking the same ends as the 
Protocol.  It is nearly impossible to predict how a DSB would resolve these 
issues without the benefit of additional disputes clarifying the TBT 
Agreement, so this requirement does not foreclose the possibility that the 
allowance requirement would be upheld. 
c. Effectiveness and Appropriateness
Members are justified in deviating from international standards when 
those standards are deemed ineffective or inappropriate.  In EC – Sardines, 
the Panel and Appellate Body disagreed over which party had the burden of 
showing that a relevant international standard was ineffective or 
inappropriate to achieve a legitimate purpose.  The Panel concluded that 
once Peru had shown that the measure at issue was a technical regulation 
and that a relevant international standard existed, the burden was on the 
European Communities to demonstrate that that standard was “an 
ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfill the legitimate objectives 
pursued by the Regulation.”63  The Appellate Body reversed the Panel on this 
point, concluding that to prove its claim, Peru had to establish that the 
relevant international standard was effective and appropriate to fulfill the 
legitimate objectives of the E.C. regulation.64  Put another way, if the 
relevant international standard is an effective and appropriate way to 
60. See Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 242 (agreeing with the Panel
and stating that “an international standard is used ‘as a basis for’ a technical 
regulation when it is used as the principal constituent or fundamental principle for 
the purpose of enacting the technical regulation”). 
61. Id. ¶ 248.
62. Id. ¶ 247.
63. Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (Panel EC –
Sardines), ¶ 7.52, WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter Panel EC – Sardines]. 
64. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 275.
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achieve the same objective, the Member’s deviation from it cannot be 
justified under the TBT Agreement. 
As of this note, it is too early to tell how effective the Kyoto Protocol 
and its successor will be at addressing climate change.  In large part, this 
will depend on the outcome of future COPs, where the next Kyoto-style 
agreement is to be completed in 2009.65  The appropriateness of the Protocol 
under the WTO is less uncertain.  Because DSBs have disapproved of 
unilateral environmental measures, it is highly likely that multilateral 
agreements such as Kyoto would receive more favorable treatment.66  
d. In the Absence of a Relevant International Standard
Alternatively, a DSB might determine that the allowance requirement 
is a technical regulation with a legitimate objective but that no relevant 
international standard exists.  It is still unclear how the U.S. regulation 
would fair, but for different reasons.  The language of the TBT Agreement 
suggests that a regulation can be evaluated on its own merits, rather than in 
the shadow of a relevant international standard, to determine whether it 
creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade or is more trade-restrictive than 
necessary.67  However, these parameters have yet to be fleshed out in 
disputes between WTO Members.  Another possibility is that a relevant 
international standard could come into existence, for instance, once the 
next round of COP negotiations is completed.  In EC – Sardines, the Appellate 
Body held that Members have “a continuing obligation” to ensure that their 
technical regulations are consistent with the TBT Agreement.68  Thus, WTO 
Members’ obligations under the TBT Agreement occupy a shifting terrain. 
As this preliminary analysis indicates, the TBT Agreement does not 
provide a solid basis for defending the allowance requirement contained in 
the Lieberman-Warner bill.  Though there are arguments that can and 
probably will be made regarding their validity as technical regulations, for 
the scheme to motivate developing countries such as China and India to 
take comparative action, it needs to have a more credible justification under 
the WTO.  As discussed in the next section, Article XX could fortify the U.S. 
allowance requirement in a way that the other provisions of the GATT 
cannot.  
65. See Spotts, supra note 19, at 1.
66. See Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions
Between Free Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 56-57, 
84-86 (2006) (suggesting that current WTO rules are probably compatible with 
multilateral environmental agreements but that its Members should clarify the role of 
such agreements either by amending Article XX or adopting an interpretive decision). 
67. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.2.
68. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 205.
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D. Article XX
“Sustainable development” is one of the clear objectives of the WTO.69  
It is iterated throughout the GATT, most specifically in the provisions of 
Article XX, where WTO Members have acknowledged the importance of 
coordinating trade and environmental policies.70  The provisions of Article 
XX have been recognized as “exceptions to substantive obligations 
established in the GATT,”71 and the chapeau of Article XX is intended to 
mark out “a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an 
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under 
varying substantive provisions” of the GATT.72  Hence, in U.S. – Gasoline, the 
Appellate Body described a two-tiered test for analyzing Article XX claims: 
First, the measure must fit comfortably within one of the listed exceptions; 
and second, the measure must comply with the chapeau of Article XX.73  
DSBs have applied the first part of the test permissively, but overcoming the 
requirements of the chapeau has proved more difficult for Members 
defending various measures before the WTO. 
1. Paragraph (g)
Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”  Generally, the exception has been construed broadly. 
“Exhaustible natural resources” is meant to be interpreted “in light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection 
and conservation of the environment.”74  As a result, the Panel in US – 
Gasoline had no trouble conceiving of clean air as an exhaustible resource.75  
Nor is it particularly challenging to show that a measure is “primarily aimed” 
at the conservation of the environment.76  A DSB looks to a regulation as a 
69. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
70. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline at 30, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate US – 
Gasoline]. 
71. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 121.
72. Id. at ¶¶ 156, 159.
73. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 22.
74. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 129.
75. Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
¶ 6.37, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Panel US – Gasoline]. 
76. See id. ¶ 6.40.
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whole, not just its trade-specific provisions, to determine whether it has a 
legitimate objective within the meaning of this provision.  In practice, 
showing that a measure fits within the scope of one of the Article XX 
exceptions has not proven difficult.77  
The first prong of the two-tiered analysis discussed in US – Gasoline 
would not impose a significant obstacle for the Lieberman-Warner 
allowance requirement; the U.S. would not have much difficulty 
demonstrating that the measure is encompassed by paragraph (g).  Based 
on contemporary concerns of the international community about addressing 
climate change, a cap-and-trade program falls squarely within the scope of 
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”  In 
addition, because clean air has already explicitly been labeled an 
exhaustible natural resource, a GHG emissions regulation is not likely to be 
found outside the scope of Article XX.  Furthermore, the objective of the 
regulation is fairly clear in this case, so it will easily satisfy the requirement 
that it be “primarily aimed at” achieving a legitimate environmental purpose.  
Again, the requirements of the chapeau raise tougher questions. 
2. The Chapeau
The chapeau of Article XX expresses the general principle of good faith 
in international law.78  Analysis of a measure under the chapeau is meant to 
limit abuse of the Article XX exceptions by Members wishing to engage in 
protectionism.  To this end, the chapeau contains three overlapping yet 
distinct prohibitions regarding the ways that a measure may be applied. 
Namely, measures cannot arbitrarily discriminate between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, unjustifiably discriminate between such 
countries or restrict international trade in a disguised way.79  The chapeau 
applies to discrimination where the same conditions prevail in the 
importing and exporting countries as well as discrimination where the same 
conditions prevail in various exporting countries.80  Thus the equalized 
treatment required to satisfy the chapeau is analogous to the principles of 
national treatment and MFN embodied in the rest of the GATT, though these 
principles are applied differently in the context of Article XX.  
If the allowance requirement is challenged, after showing that the 
measure is encompassed by paragraph (g), the U.S. would have the burden 
of making a prima facie showing that that measure does not constitute 
77. Appellate US v. Gasoline, supra note 70, at 18 (discussing the “heavier task”
of proving abuse of an exception compared to provisionally justifying it under the 
Article XX exceptions). 
78. Id. at 13-14.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id.
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abuse of the Article XX exceptions as defined in the chapeau.  If the U.S. can 
make this initial showing, which seems quite feasible, the burden would be 
on the challenging Member to put forth arguments and evidence which 
rebut U.S. claims that the measure is not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminatory or a disguised restriction on trade.  Here, a number of likely 
challenges are apparent, but if the U.S. is cautious about how it enacts and 
applies its cap-and-trade program, it will have strong arguments in support 
of its position. 
a. Arbitrary Discrimination
When presented with claims of discrimination, DSBs have looked to 
the manner in which a measure was enacted as well as the ways in which it 
was applied and the outcomes it produced.  Thus, a finding of 
discrimination might be based on a measure’s procedural or substantive 
failings.  In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body disapproved of the manner in 
which the U.S. had enacted legislation dealing with shrimp harvesting and 
the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs).81  After having required U.S. shrimp 
trawlers to use TEDs, Congress passed a law banning shrimp imports from 
countries that were not certified by the U.S.  The policy did not address 
differing conditions in each country and implemented a uniform standard 
for other Members’ imports.  In other words, the U.S. arbitrarily prescribed 
its own TED regulations for importing countries.  Noting that the U.S. had 
not considered the possibility that different conditions might prevail in 
those countries, the Appellate Body expressed vehement disapproval of the 
measure: “[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO 
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt 
essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, . . . without taking 
into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of 
those other Members.”82  Therefore, a program may violate the GATT 
because of procedural shortcomings if it is enacted without regard for other 
Members’ interests. 
A country challenging the allowance program would likely analogize it 
with the TED regulation, another performance standard which the U.S. 
adopted first and then tried to coerce other countries into adopting.  Part of 
the problem with the TED rules was that there was no means for countries to 
appeal the initial decisions of U.S. officials charged with implementing the 
law.83  It is unclear how much process must be made available to 
81. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 164.
82. Id. at ¶¶ 164-65.
83. One could argue that the reason procedural safeguards are not provided is
typically not that they are onerous in themselves, but that they make it impossible 
for an entity to deny that it “knew better.”  Thus, a DSB might require procedure as a 
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international trading partners, but providing the hallmarks of due process – 
notice of the details of the allowance requirement and an opportunity to be 
heard – would not be burdensome.  Some duly provided means to appeal 
decisions and have them reviewed would probably suffice.  Though this 
might extend the time before the U.S. could impose the allowance 
requirement and entail additional negotiation and litigation costs, the U.S. 
could minimize these costs by putting countries on notice as soon as 
possible about the allowance requirement and providing a clear process for 
countries to raise their concerns before it takes effect.  
In US – Shrimp, the application of the TED regulation also caused 
problems.  U.S. officials rigidly required countries to adopt “essentially the 
same” program that the U.S. had in order to become certified.84  Officials 
responsible for implementing the TED regulation did not follow a 
transparent, predictable certification process, nor did they implement a 
procedure for review or appeal once an application for certification was 
denied.85  As discussed above, the Lieberman-Warner bill would grant the 
President and the Administrator a considerable amount of discretion but 
does not contain provisions regarding procedural review for countries 
affected by the exercise of that discretion.  While granting leeway to the 
President and the Administrator may not in itself create substantial trade 
issues, the care with which these officials use or abuse that discretion could 
raise questions for a DSB.  
In addition to finding that the “intended and actual coercive effect on 
other governments” rendered U.S. rules on TEDs discriminatory,86 the 
Appellate Body noted that the U.S. regulation created arbitrary results.  For 
example, even a vessel equipped with a TED could not import shrimp into 
the U.S. if the country it hailed from had not enacted a regulatory framework 
comparable to the one the U.S. had.87  Thus, discrimination occurred 
because, as it was applied by U.S. officials, the TED regulation led to 
arbitrary outcomes.  Consequently, the U.S. will have to be wary of causing 
arbitrary results when it requires importers to purchase allowances.  For 
instance, if a “green” foreign steel producer had to buy allowances because 
its government had not taken comparable action to address climate change, 
the result could be seen as arbitrary.  Clean factories in developing countries 
present a unique problem because under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), many developed nations are meeting their 
targets by implementing programs in developing countries which reduce 
stand-in for consideration, as it cannot actually force WTO Members to care about 
one another’s interests. 
84. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 161.
85. Id. ¶ 180.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id. ¶ 165.
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GHG emissions around the globe.  To require allowances from a clean 
foreign producer might be seen as an arbitrary result.  On the other hand, in 
the case of CDM projects at least, the U.S. could argue that emissions 
reductions lack “additionality.”88  That is, they are essentially being counted 
twice because a developed country is already getting credit for the 
reductions, and counting them again as the equivalent of allowances made 
in the U.S. industry defeats the legitimate objective behind having them. 
The U.S. should craft clear guidelines in this area to avoid having to defend 
against an apparently arbitrary result.89 
b. Unjust Discrimination
The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline found unjust discrimination by the 
U.S. because it implemented measures relating to gasoline refiners without 
sufficiently cooperating with other governments to try to mitigate the effects 
of the measure.90  US – Gasoline concerned EPA regulations on reformulated 
gasoline that gave domestic refiners an option for compliance that was not 
available to foreign refiners.91  Whereas domestic refiners could establish 
individual baselines, which could be quite beneficial in the new regulatory 
scheme, or were subject to a statutory baseline, foreign refiners were 
automatically subject to a statutory baseline.92  Discriminating between 
domestic and foreign refiners was unjust in that case because the U.S. had 
not even attempted to collaborate with other countries to mitigate the 
effects of the measure on their refiners.  Here again, the process of enacting 
the measure was part of what made it objectionable under the GATT. 
Moreover, the U.S. did not consider the costs foreign refiners would face 
under its rules for establishing baselines.93  Combined, these two flaws in 
the U.S. legislative process resulted in unjust discrimination against its 
international trading partners.  
A challenging country could argue that the allowance requirement is 
unjust because in the process of enacting its cap-and-trade regulations the 
U.S. failed to cooperate with other countries or to give adequate 
consideration to the costs of their compliance.  A DSB is likely to be 
unsympathetic if the U.S. fails to cooperate with foreign governments to 
88. See Jennifer P. Morgan, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and
Opportunities for Investors, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 177 (2006) (discussing the 
additionality requirement in the context of gaining approval for CDM projects). 
89. International offsets present other potential complications that are
discussed in Part V.B. 
90. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 27.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 28.
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mitigate the costs of the allowances, such as by allowing foreign companies 
the same opportunities that domestic ones have to purchase allowances 
and to earn them through additional reductions and offsets.  In other words, 
it would be uncooperative of the U.S. to impose a statutory allowance 
requirement on importers if it makes options available to domestic 
producers that are not available internationally, as this was part of what 
made the U.S. gasoline regulations illegal.94  Moreover, though this 
shortcoming alone might not be sufficient to invalidate the allowance 
requirement, a DSB might look to the cumulative effects of the regime, as it 
did in US – Shrimp, to determine whether free trade had been unjustifiably 
restricted.95 
Alternatively, a challenging country could argue that the U.S. failed to 
give adequate consideration to its costs, which were foreseeable when the 
U.S. imposed the additional requirement.  The “comparable action” 
provisions of an allowance scheme could also draw fire from international 
trading partners.  Though the Executive Branch would have discretion to 
determine whether comparable action had been taken in another country, 
exercising such discretion too narrowly could violate the GATT.  Though the 
U.S. would likely point to the level of GHG emissions in a developing 
country such as China, China might point to different considerations that 
the U.S. failed to adequately address.  Such considerations include its 
overall level of development, its significantly greater population or its lower 
historical emissions, to argue that it did not receive due consideration 
because of its different prevailing conditions.  Or, if the U.S. applied a rule in 
such a way that only an emissions cap could qualify as comparable action, 
another country might point to per capita emissions as a more equitable 
basis for comparison.  Thus, decisions about comparable action in other 
countries need to be based on flexible criteria, made with consideration for 
the interests of U.S. trading partners and, ideally, preceded by discussions 
with officials from the affected countries.  This will offer a defense to claims 
of arbitrary U.S. unilateralism. 
c. Disguised Restrictions on Trade
Finally, whether a measure constitutes a “disguised restriction on 
international trade” depends on many of the same factors that indicate 
94. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 28.
95. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 176 (“When the foregoing differences in the
means of application of Section 609 to various shrimp exporting countries are 
considered in their cumulative effect, we find, and so hold, that those differences in 
treatment constitute ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ between exporting countries 
desiring certification in order to gain access to the United States shrimp market 
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX.”). 
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arbitrary or unjust discrimination.96  Determining whether a measure is 
“necessary” may be relative to the specific circumstances of a case.  DSBs are 
especially wary of protectionist measures couched as exceptions under 
Article XX.  Thus, a challenging country might argue that the allowance 
program constituted a disguised restriction on trade because it protects U.S. 
energy-intensive industries at the expense of other Members’ industries.  To 
the extent that the U.S. imposes allowance regulations that are out of sync 
with the rest of the world, which continues to cooperate on ways to combat 
climate change, its approach will appear to be designed to achieve other 
objectives.  By taking a flexible view of comparable action in other countries 
and by allowing international offsets on terms similar to those of the EU 
emissions trading system (ETS), the U.S. can avoid fashioning the allowance 
requirement as an arbitrary restriction on trade. 
D. Additional Policy Aspects of an Effective
Cap-and-Trade Regime
The concept of sustainable development is consistent with the notion 
that promoting trade and protecting the environment need not be viewed as 
a zero-sum game.  A cap-and-trade approach to mitigating climate change, 
particularly one that is negotiated multilaterally, is consistent with the 
objectives of the GATT.97  Moreover, in the international context, the narrow 
type of command-and-control regulations that have reduced environmental 
dangers in other areas, such as curtailing the use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals, are poorly suited for meeting the broad challenge of climate 
change.98  Each country values its sovereignty.  A cap-and-trade approach 
gives countries flexibility in how they achieve emissions targets that benefit 
everyone, and this flexibility is crucial to gaining the worldwide acceptance 
and support that is necessary to tackle this problem.  The sheer magnitude 
of the changes necessary to switch to a low-carbon economy suggests that 
the preferred approaches of individual countries will vary dramatically and 
that a command-and-control scheme will meet with limited success.  
Furthermore, the WTO has become a credible place for resolving the 
world’s disputes, some of which deal only tangentially with trade.99  It is 
96. See Appellate US v. Gasoline, supra note 70, at 25.  There, the Appellate Body
concluded that the gasoline measures constituted both “unjustifiable discrimination” and 
a “disguised restriction on international trade.”  Id.  
97. See Carlarne, supra note 66, at 54 (noting that GATT Panels have implied that
internationally negotiated environmental measures related to trade could provide 
reasonable grounds for invoking Article XX’s exceptions). 
98. Barrett, supra note 21, at 835.
99. See Andrew L. Strauss, From GATTzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the
Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
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important that environmental regulation, which traditionally lacks strong 
enforcement mechanisms, be compatible with it.100  In addition, bringing 
market forces to bear on the problem will help meet targets efficiently by 
providing broad incentives for finding ways to reduce GHG emissions. 
Whereas under a command-and-control regulatory approach emitters have 
the incentive to reduce emissions only to a certain extent and to go no 
further than necessary, a market approach with tradable allowances provides 
an incentive to reduce emissions and to innovate as much as possible.101  
Furthermore, as markets grow bigger they become more efficient, and 
creating a program that has the capability of linking with the E.U. ETS, as 
has been suggested by some commentators, will lead to lower costs of 
compliance.102  Under a broad cap-and-trade program, reductions will first be 
made where there is comparable reduction advantage.  In other words, the 
most cost effective changes will be made first, which should benefit some 
countries and reduce costs for all. 
IV. Carbon Intensity Standards
Shortly after declaring that the U.S. would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2001, President Bush announced plans that the U.S. would lower its 
nationwide carbon intensity by 18 percent between 2002 and 2012.103  As 
commentators have been quick to point out, however, unless emissions 
intensity improves faster than the economy grows, under this framework 
total GHG emissions will continue to rise.104  Indeed, the National Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) projects GHG emissions will continue to increase 
by 14 percent per decade even if the plan’s voluntary intensity targets are 
769, 775 (1998) (arguing that the WTO could be “an effective forum for the creation 
and enforcement of harmonized international standards relating to process 
production methods . . . in such areas as clean air, clean water, hazardous waste, 
occupational health and safety, and national resource preservation.”).  
100. See id. at 815-16 (noting that environmental agreements often face stiff
opposition from certain corporate sectors but that comprehensive trade negotiations 
that include environmental measures are likely to face less opposition because they 
offer an overall benefit to those sectors). 
101. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Kjell Olav Kristiansen, Director,
Advisory Services, Point Carbon North America). 
102. See Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).
103. NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, “EMISSIONS INTENSITY” – POLLUTION BY 
ANY OTHER NAME? 2 (2005), http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fintensity.asp 
[hereinafter NRDC]; see also, Mary Anne Sullivan, Voluntary Plans Will Not Cut Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions in the Electricity Sector, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 47, 47 (2006). 
104. NRDC, supra note 103, at 1.
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met.105  In addition, because the steel industry makes many non-
standardized products, applying carbon intensity standards in this area 
poses extra administrative and accounting difficulties.  Alternatively, 
emissions could be measured against economic output (e.g., by dollar value 
created), but this poses another set of difficulties.  Finally, there seems to be 
little point in going through these calculations because, ultimately, “the 
atmosphere doesn’t care about emissions intensity.”106 
Although both Argentina and the U.K. have experimented with 
intensity commitments, no developed country other than the U.S. currently 
relies on this model to reduce its GHG emissions.107  Nevertheless, carbon 
intensity standards have been resurrected by the steel industry in 
congressional debates about GHG regulations.  Members of the steel 
industry do not support the Lieberman-Warner approach because they feel it 
does not provide enough protection for domestic producers in energy-
intensive industries such as cement and steel.  Some business leaders and 
legislators evoke the specter of a worst-of-both-worlds scenario in which 
GHG regulation leads to exportation of U.S. jobs and an actual increase in 
emissions as countries without comparable emissions standards produce 
abroad what was once made domestically with fewer GHG emissions.108  
Carbon intensity standards, they argue, are designed to stem the export of 
U.S. jobs, while encouraging foreign producers to adopt cleaner 
technologies in the most energy-intensive sectors of the economy.  They 
argue further that their approach would lead to greater reductions in GHG 
emissions than are likely to result from a cap-and-trade regime.  However, 
this approach also presents apparent conflicts with WTO obligations, and 
intensity standards themselves, while not inherently lax, have yet to produce 
meaningful progress on climate change. 
A. Elements of the Proposal
The U.S. steel industry is advocating “carbon intensity standards” as an 
alternative to or a component of national GHG legislation.109  Noting that 
Chinese steel production results in emissions estimated to be two to three 
times higher than U.S. production, the industry would like to see products 
that fail to meet carbon intensity requirements banned from import into the 
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4.
107. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11.
108. In addition, some legislators profess not to believe that climate change is
real.  See Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Joe Barton). 
109. U.S. Steel Makers Push Carbon-Intensity Approach to Climate Change.  INSIDE US-
CHINA TRADE, Mar. 12, 2008, at 1. 
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U.S. market.110  The industry argues that these performance standards would 
be consistent with the GATT because they qualify as a “technical regulation” 
under the TBT Agreement.  Their approach could also be applied to 
domestic and foreign producers simultaneously, they claim, which means it 
would protect U.S. jobs in ways that temporally staggered provisions of the 
Lieberman-Warner bill would not.111  However, the lack of a delay provision 
raises further questions about compliance with WTO obligations.112  Though 
the TBT Agreement provides a conceivable rationale under which carbon 
intensity standards could be viewed as legitimate to a DSB, it would be 
imprudent for the U.S. to rely exclusively on such a legal theory. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that even if such standards are 
eventually upheld by a WTO panel, the possibility that they might not be 
takes away from the credibility of the standards and their effectiveness at 
prompting exporting countries to adopt comparable measures. 
Carbon intensity standards have an even less colorable claim at being 
compatible with the general provisions of the GATT than the Lieberman-
Warner approach.  Article XI’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions on 
trade is unequivocal: “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges, . . . shall be instituted or maintained . . . on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party.”113  
Quantitative restrictions are the least-favored restrictions on trade, and a 
ban on goods based on their carbon intensity is clearly inconsistent with 
this provision of the GATT.  Furthermore, the MFN provision of the GATT 
presents another obvious obstacle to enforcing carbon intensity standards 
because the U.S. would be subjecting goods from countries that did not 
abide by the standards to less favorable treatment.  Under current WTO 
doctrine, the term “like product” in Article I is interpreted broadly, and DSBs 
have not embraced differences based on PPMs.  Nonetheless, proponents of 
carbon intensity standards say they could be justified under the TBT 
Agreement or Article XX. 
B. Carbon Intensity Standards and the TBT Agreement
As discussed above in Part III.C., should a Member wish to challenge 
U.S. carbon intensity standards, it would first have to show that the 
standards constitute a “technical regulation.”  Then the challenging Member 
would have to show that the regulation does not fulfill a “legitimate 
110. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery).
111. According to the current bill, international reserve allowances would not
be required of importers until 2020, whereas U.S. producers’ emissions would be 
capped beginning in 2012.  Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at § 6001 et seq. 
112. Hearing, supra note 17, at 14 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).
113. GATT, supra note 34, art. XI.
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objective” or that it is “more trade-restrictive than necessary.”  In addition, 
the TBT Agreement contains particular notification provisions, which are 
designed to give Members time to become acquainted with regulations 
before they take effect.  DSBs have had limited occasion to interpret the TBT 
Agreement; perhaps the dearth of precedent analyzing its various provisions 
makes it well suited as a screen upon which the steel industry can project its 
own legal interpretations and draw theoretical legal conclusions that have 
yet to be tested in practice.  However, there is no guarantee that U.S. trading 
partners will accede to such interpretations. 
1. Technical Regulations
Carbon intensity standards meet the requirements of a technical 
regulation much more easily than international reserve allowances do.  As 
discussed in Part III.C.1, a technical regulation must apply to an identifiable 
product, lay down characteristics of that product and be mandatory.  Unlike 
the broadly defined products and characteristics in the Lieberman-Warner 
bill, the products and characteristics of carbon intensity standards would 
presumably be more specific.  Because a technical regulation can be based 
on either “product characteristics” or “processes and production methods,” 
it is irrelevant to this analysis that the amount of carbon emitted in the 
production of a product is not an inherent characteristic of the product 
itself.  And of course the standards would be mandatory.  Furthermore, like 
the incomplete ban in EC – Asbestos,114 under a carbon intensity regime, the 
U.S. would not be instituting a complete ban on imports from specified 
industries.  Rather, only those products that did not meet the performance 
standards would be excluded from U.S. markets.  Thus, it appears likely that 
carbon intensity standards would be analyzed as a technical regulation in a 
WTO proceeding. 
2. Legitimate Objectives
Again, the inclusive list of “legitimate objectives” found in Article 2.2, 
including “protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment,” suggests that this requirement would be 
construed liberally.  There is little doubt that “legitimate objectives” would 
be construed broadly enough by a DSB to support the validity of carbon 
intensity standards taken as a whole, just as it would be in the event the 
allowance requirement were challenged. 
114. See Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 8.72, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
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3. Least Trade-Restrictive Manner
The biggest problem with carbon intensity standards in a WTO dispute 
is that they appear to be more trade restrictive than necessary or to create 
an unnecessary obstacle to trade.  Though the U.S. would have to explain 
the justification for taking this approach,115 a challenging Member would 
have to show that the measure was not necessary.  Under the three-part test 
laid out in EC v. Sardines and discussed in Part III.C.3, carbon intensity 
standards would face formidable obstacles in a DSB dispute.  First, either 
the relevant international standard will be found within a multilateral 
agreement addressing climate change such as the Kyoto Protocol or its 
progeny, which raises one set of problems, or no such relevant standard will 
be found to exist, which raises another set of problems.  Second, even if 
there is such a standard, it would not very likely be seen as the basis for 
carbon intensity standards.  Third, a standard developed through multi-
lateral negotiation is probably an effective and appropriate way to address 
climate change.  
a. Relevant International Standard
As international negotiations on environmental agreements move 
forward, they do not seem to be embracing the concept of carbon intensity 
standards.  Rather, there is a growing consensus that global GHG emissions 
need to be capped to avert a global disaster.116  Thus, if there is a relevant 
international standard or if one is emerging, it is based on absolute caps on 
emissions, at least for developed countries.  Although Argentina and the 
U.K. have experimented with national energy-intensity standards,117 there 
are no relevant international standards similar to those the U.S. steel 
industry would promulgate.  This is not fatal to carbon intensity standards, 
but it does suggest that it could be difficult to defend this approach against 
charges that it creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade.  As discussed in 
Part III.C.3.d, one can only speculate about how the TBT Agreement will be 
interpreted in the absence of a relevant international standard.  
b. “As a Basis For”
If a DSB finds there is a relevant international standard on GHG 
emissions, a Member challenging carbon intensity standards would next 
have to establish that it was not used “as a basis for” the U.S. measure to 
prove that it is inconsistent with the GATT.  It is difficult to reconcile the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” with carbon 
115. See TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.2.
116. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 69.
117. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11.
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intensity standards, which would impose the same level of efficiency and 
responsibility on all producers of certain products.  Moreover, it is fanciful to 
suggest that the notion of capping emissions and trading allowances, which 
the global community is embracing, is the basis for a command-and-control 
type of regulation, which other Members are likely to believe infringes upon 
their sovereignty.  On the other hand, the U.S. might point to the Preamble 
to the UNFCCC, which calls for “taking into account the possibilities for 
achieving greater energy efficiency . . . through the application of new 
technologies,” to argue that there are competing international standards in 
the area of GHG regulation and that it has in fact used relevant international 
standards as the basis for its approach.  Still, it is much easier to imagine a 
DSB agreeing with a Member’s assertion that relevant international 
standards were not used as a basis for a U.S. measure implementing carbon 
intensity standards.  
c. Least Trade-Restrictive Means
Finally, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement permits Members to depart 
from a relevant international standard if it would be an “ineffective or 
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.” 
In EC v. Sardines, the Panel described an ineffective means as “a means which 
does not have the function of accomplishing the legitimate objective 
pursued.”118  In comparison, an inappropriate means is “a means which is not 
specially suitable for the fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.”119  
The Panel elaborated: “The question of effectiveness bears upon the results of 
the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates more 
to the nature of the means employed.”120  Although multilateral agreements 
addressing climate change are still evolving, the increasingly apparent 
urgency of the problem combined with the understanding that major 
emitters cannot be left out of the solution suggest that future agreements 
will probably be the most effective and appropriate means of addressing 
climate change given certain geopolitical realities. 
While it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
appears to be reducing GHG emissions to less than they would have been in 
its absence.121  Given the scope of the problem and the timeframes involved, 
a DSB would likely have to rely on projections to determine whether 
particular measures are effective, which will depend on the specific 
international agreements in place at the time carbon intensity standards 
take effect.  In terms of appropriateness, US – Shrimp strongly suggests that 
118. Panel EC – Sardines, supra note 63, ¶ 7.116.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 62.
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multilateral environmental agreements can fit comfortably with the WTO 
framework.122  Again, predictions on how a DSB would rule can only be 
speculative until there is more litigation involving the TBT Agreement. 
However, there seem to be many paths to successfully challenging the 
legality of carbon intensity standards. 
4. Notification Provisions
The TBT Agreement also contains transparency-promoting provisions 
that require Members to notify other Members about proposed regulations 
whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the regulation 
is not in accordance with relevant international standards.123  Notifications 
shall “take place at an early appropriate stage, when amendments can still 
be introduced and comments taken into account.”124  Moreover, Members 
are to “allow reasonable time for other Members to make comments in 
writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written 
comments and the results of these discussions into account.”125  Similar 
provisions address conformity assessment procedures126 and enquiry 
points.127  Additionally, “Members shall allow a reasonable interval between 
the publication of technical regulations and their entry into force in order to 
allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in 
developing country Members, to adapt their products or methods of 
production to the requirements of the importing Member.”128  Though these 
procedural requirements do not pose substantive barriers to enacting 
carbon intensity standards, they do create the potential for delay. 
According to the steel industry, a major advantage of carbon intensity 
standards over requiring international reserve allowances from importers is 
that they could be implemented contemporaneously for importers and 
domestic producers.129  In contrast, the Lieberman-Warner bill envisions a 
delay of eight years between the imposition of the domestic cap on GHG 
emissions and the requirement that importers from non-capped countries 
122. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 166.
123. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.9.
124. Id. art. 2.9.2.
125. Id. art. 2.9.4.
126. See id. art. 5.
127. See id. art. 10.
128. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.12.
129. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Abraham Breehey, Assistant Director
of Government Affairs, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship 
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers). 
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provide international reserve allowances.130  However, there is a high 
likelihood that carbon intensity standards will entail some delay before they 
apply to any producers, domestic or foreign.  These delays increase the 
overall cost of reducing GHG concentrations to safe levels, according to the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.131  
 Furthermore, the provisions of the TBT Agreement are meant to 
ensure that the concerns of developing countries in particular are 
considered when Members adopt technical regulations.132  Although there 
are no precedents elucidating the test to measure whether a Member had 
adequately considered the concerns of developing countries, in light of the 
express language of Article 2.12, blatant disregard for those concerns is 
likely to draw criticism from a DSB.133  Thus, although the notification 
provisions are not likely to be the basis on which a DSB invalidates a 
technical regulation, a lack of transparency along with other problematic 
aspects in the application of a regulation could contribute to its cumulative 
effects, which could, in sum, violate the GATT.134 
A. Carbon Intensity Standards and Article XX
In contrast to the lack of interpretative decisions regarding the TBT 
Agreement, there is ample WTO precedent indicating that carbon intensity 
standards would have significant barriers to overcome to be justified under 
Article XX.  In US – Shrimp, for example, the U.S. regulation regarding TEDs 
was applied in a way that had a coercive effect on other nations because it 
required a regulatory scheme that was “essentially the same” as the U.S. 
approach to protecting sea turtles.  Although U.S. officials are now 
forewarned about applying the carbon intensity requirement according to a 
rigid and unbending standard, there is less room for flexibility with carbon 
intensity standards, which would require essentially the same production 
methods for many products, than there is with international allowances. 
This would depend on a more lenient standard, i.e., “comparable action” by 
other WTO Members.  Indeed, a fundamental reason why carbon intensity 
standards appeal to various industry groups is that they can be tailored to 
favor domestic industries.  Further, they are rigid, making it onerous for 
trading partners to comply with them.  But this is not efficient, and therefore 
this approach is fundamentally at odds with the WTO’s goal of promoting 
market efficiency through liberalized trade policies. 
130. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).
131. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 62.
132. See TBT Agreement, supra note 44, pmbl.
133. See id. art. 2.12.
134. See US v. Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 176 (discussing transparency and
procedural fairness in trade regulations). 
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Moreover, one of the purported justifications for the TED regulations 
that the Appellate Body rejected was that it would enhance the transfer of 
technology to developing countries.135  The same argument is being made by 
the steel industry today in support of carbon intensity standards.136  
However, WTO precedent makes it clear that even if a measure can be 
justified on policy grounds, it will not satisfy the requirements of the 
chapeau if it results in arbitrary or unjust discrimination or is a disguised 
restriction on trade.  There is a strong likelihood that carbon intensity 
standards would fail to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau to Article 
XX. Given the numerous arguments that could be made as to their
arbitrariness and inappropriateness, it is not surprising that the steel
industry is looking to the TBT Agreement rather than Article XX as a basis for
defending their preferred approach.
B. Policy Features Related to Carbon Intensity Standards
Aside from the legal aspects of carbon intensity standards that make 
them less than ideal, yet another, more fundamental, difficulty with this 
approach is that reducing carbon intensity does not necessarily cut total 
emissions.  The Bush administration’s 2002 pledge to reduce carbon 
intensity by 18 percent through voluntary efforts illustrates why a WTO panel 
might look skeptically at carbon intensity standards.  Because such 
measures do not necessarily lead to reductions, it is hard to argue that they 
are necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.  Furthermore, “because 
performance standards do not encourage end users to reduce their 
consumption of carbon intensive goods, they will leave behind some low 
cost abatement opportunities, thereby raising the overall cost to all the rest 
of us of achieving a particular emissions target.”137 
Though carbon intensity standards are not inherently ineffective, 
neither are they inherently effective.  As most of the world has opted to 
combat climate change by adopting regulatory schemes with absolute 
targets, one can anticipate that a DSB may be critical of a Member 
advocating a different approach that has not proven effective in the past.  In 
its assessment of intensity targets, the World Resources Institute concluded 
that “[i]ntensity targets can work alongside absolute targets [but] data and 
experience suggest that there is not a clear advantage of doing so.”138  The 
steel industry has argued that the lure of U.S. markets will entice foreign 
manufacturers to quickly adopt carbon-efficient technology that they 
135. Id. ¶¶ 22, 51, 175.
136. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery).
137. Id. (statement of Richard Morgenstern, Senior Fellow, Resources for the
Future). 
138. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 1, at 24.
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otherwise would not have, at least with regard to the products made for the 
U.S. market.139  Other Members may soon adopt similar measures, the 
argument goes, furthering the effectiveness at reducing GHG emissions via 
performance standards.  This line of argument remains rather speculative. 
At the same time, a key feature of intensity targets is that “the ultimate 
environmental outcome cannot be known in advance with certainty.”140  Such 
theoretical results are unlikely to be persuasive before a DSB.  In addition, 
carbon intensity standards have a shabby track record for reducing GHG 
emissions in the U.S.  Though it is true that this has more to do with their 
lack of stringency than the form the emission targets have taken, this could 
raise more concerns with a DSB, particularly as other Members are achieving 
meaningful reductions in GHG emissions through other means. 
Moreover, there is a growing consensus that global cooperation is 
necessary to combat climate change, and carbon intensity standards are at 
odds with the approach that has been favored internationally.  General 
principles of international law obligate nations to ensure that their actions 
“conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another 
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”141  Additionally, 
the TBT Agreement requires that international standards be selected when 
they are available.  The carbon intensity approach does not conform to the 
internationally recognized approach already underway with the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Another principle of international law is that nations who enter 
international agreements should “refrain from acts that would defeat the 
object and purpose of the agreement.”142  Not only would carbon intensity 
standards possibly conflict with the UNFCCC, which obligates all nations to 
take action to combat climate change, it is also at odds with basic principles 
of the GATT.  Article XX requires environmental measures to avoid arbitrary 
and unjust discrimination, but there are many indications that this is 
precisely why they are favored by certain industry groups in the U.S. 
Especially in the realm of environmental protection and when the U.S. until 
recently carried the banner of the world’s greatest emitter of GHGs, 
adherence to general principles of international law is key to promoting 
earnest negotiation and cooperation. 
Even if carbon intensity standards would be effective at reducing GHG 
emissions, an even larger problem is their apparent inappropriateness.  In 
139. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery).
140. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.  Indeed, the tradeoff of greater
economic certainty for less environmental certainty is precisely why intensity 
standards appeal to certain industry groups. 
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601(1)(a) (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement]. 
142. Restatement, supra note 141, § 312(3).
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EC – Asbestos, the Panel noted that “when a relevant international standard is 
found to be an effective means, it does not automatically follow that it is 
also an appropriate one.”143  Although protecting the environment by 
limiting GHG emissions may be a legitimate objective, adopting measures 
that ninety percent of U.S. industry already complies with and that are costly 
for other Members to comply with would generate skepticism before a DSB. 
Furthermore, the complexity of carbon intensity standards poses additional 
administrative costs, which are difficult to justify in the absence of their 
proven effectiveness.  One way that technical regulations can inhibit 
international trade is when demonstrating conformity with the regulation 
results in undue costs.144  Because developing countries are less likely to 
have adequate regulatory agencies and equipment in place, these costs 
would be significant.  When most of the cost of a technical regulation is 
borne by countries least able to pay, a DSB is more likely to find the 
measure to be an inappropriate means of achieving a legitimate objective. 
Particularly when other regulatory schemes already in place such as 
emissions trading reduce the costs associated with limiting GHG emissions, 
a U.S. scheme that mandates those costs be borne by specified industries in 
specified countries is likely to face intense scrutiny. 
V. Some Additional Considerations for GHG Policy Design
Lawmakers agree that there is no silver bullet to stop the relentless
advance of climate change.  Every approach to addressing this problem is an 
imperfect one, but perhaps the least perfect one of all is to maintain the 
status quo, in a perpetual staring contest with the developing world to see 
who will blink first.  The key is to stop blindly following a policy that 
continues to make the problem worse and to take action that will open the 
eyes of the market to the many available solutions.  Senators Bingaman and 
Specter145 sponsored a bill competing with Lieberman-Warner that offers a 
suggestion of a few of the variations that are possible in a cap-and-trade 
program that may be helpful to lawmakers seeking a politically feasible 
approach.  In addition, environmental groups such as the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) and the NRDC have testified before congressional 
committees as to how the cap-and-trade framework can be adjusted to 
produce the greatest results in terms of the environment at the least cost. 
Other government agencies in the U.S. and abroad have analyzed the issue 
in depth as well.  Their collective contributions deserve mention here so as 
143. Panel EC – Sardines, supra note 63, ¶ 7.116. See also Appellate EC –
Asbestos, supra note 49, ¶ 289 (noting that “it is conceptually possible that a 
measure could be effective but inappropriate, or appropriate but ineffective”). 
144. See Sykes, supra note 44, at 3-4.
145. Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007).
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to make it clear that even if carbon intensity standards are taken off the 
table, lawmakers nevertheless have ample flexibility in designing an effective 
GHG emissions program. 
A. Safety Valve
A safety valve is a price limit on allowances – emitters can buy as many 
allowances as they want at a particular price.  The Lieberman-Warner bill 
does not contain a safety valve; the hope is that this will provide greater 
incentives for emitters to reduce their GHG emissions.  Environmental 
groups oppose having a price cap, noting that this would provide insufficient 
incentives for businesses to innovate and reduce emissions.146  The IPCC’s 
Fourth Assessment Report estimates that an effective carbon-price signal 
would have to be around $20-80, though technological advances might 
reduce that range to $5-65.147 
The Bingaman-Specter proposal has garnered support from industry 
groups such as the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship 
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers because it includes a price cap on 
emissions credits, which it calls “technology accelerator payments.”148  The 
fees collected would go to developing additional technology or assisting 
workers who were displaced under a carbon-regulated economy.  Under their 
proposal, the cap would start at $12 per metric ton of carbon, increasing 5 
percent above the rate of inflation each year.149  The National Commission 
on Energy Policy recommended a similar policy in its August 2007 report.150  
At first glance, a steadily increasing cap seems like a good way to 
accommodate the concerns of each side; however, a safety valve would 
preclude the U.S. from linking its trading system with the E.U. ETS.151  
Because larger markets are inherently more efficient, the U.S. should not 
pass on this opportunity to reduce costs.  
B. Offsets
Offsets are emissions credits earned by those who reduce emissions. 
In its latest form, the Lieberman-Warner bill would allow emitters to submit 
146. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).
147. JANE A. LEGGETT, CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE UPDATE 2007, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. DOC. NO. RL34266, at 13-14 (2007). 
148. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Abraham Breehey).
149. LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: CAP-AND-
TRADE BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. DOC. NO. 33846, at 3 (2007). 
150. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY, ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT AND 100TH CONGRESS 12 (2008). 
151. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).
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domestic offsets for up to 15 percent of their required allowances.152  
Another 15 percent of their allowances could be earned from international 
offsets.153  All offsets would have to be verified according to the regulations 
promulgated by the Administrator.154  The E.U.’s experience with emissions 
trading indicates how important offsets can be to achieving emissions 
targets on schedule and at a reasonable cost.  Interestingly, the allowance of 
international offsets was a hard-won concession by the U.S. in the Kyoto 
negotiations.  As the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol gets 
underway, it is already apparent to many European countries that the CDM 
is the most important means for the EU to comply with its obligations.155  
Members of the EDF have proposed amending the Lieberman-Warner 
proposal to create an international market for GHG emissions credits and 
allowing even countries without caps to participate, at least for a time, and 
albeit their emissions would not be accepted on a one-to-one ratio with 
reductions in countries where emissions are capped.156  Therefore, countries 
without caps would still have an incentive to impose them.  An additional 
benefit for U.S. producers is that the access to international credits would 
significantly reduce their compliance costs.  Provisionally allowing 
international offsets would reduce compliance costs for U.S. industry in the 
short term and pave the way for lower emissions worldwide in the long term. 
Furthermore, accepting offsets as an international currency in emissions 
trading would give importers an alternative to purchasing credits directly 
from the U.S.  This would add legitimacy to the requirement that 
international reserve allowances accompany imports into the U.S. and 
possibly preclude a DSB from finding unjust discrimination has resulted 
from the program. 
C. Targets and Scope
As with the multitude of allowance schemes in proposed bills, there 
have been a number of proposed reduction targets based on various 
percentages and baseline years.  The Fourth Assessment Report suggests 
that an appropriate target for developed countries would be a 60 percent to 
80 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050.157  The target set in the 
current version of the Lieberman-Warner proposal will not achieve this level 
of reductions; the goals of the Bingaman-Specter bill are less ambitious. 
152. See Climate Security Act, supra note 30, § 2402 et seq.
153. See id. § 2501 et seq.
154. Id.
155. See Morgan, supra note 88, at 158.
156. Jutta Hennig, Congress Weighs Competing Requirements in Climate Change Bills,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 7, 2008, at 2. 
157. LEGGETT, supra note 147, at 14.
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Because of the cumulative effect of GHGs in the atmosphere, current 
reductions significantly reduce the amount of reductions that will eventually 
be needed.  However, most commentators agree that any movement in the 
right direction by setting an absolute cap now will pay dividends.  
Many commentators also agree that the lowest cost for reducing GHG 
emissions would be achieved if all emissions were included in a cap-and-
trade proposal, or alternatively, if a carbon tax were imposed across the 
board on all energy consumption.  The task of creating such a system is so 
large that it might never happen.  Meanwhile, a cap-and-trade program on 
energy-intensive industries is a good place to start.  This will address about 
half of U.S. emissions from the outset, and the program is readily 
expandable because allowances are tradable. 
VI. Conclusion
Legislators who are reluctant to address the problem of climate 
change will always be able to list reasons to “wait and see” before enacting 
such a major piece of legislation.  But it is abundantly clear that the costs of 
addressing climate change increase exponentially with delay.  Furthermore, 
to be effective, a policy needs to have broad bipartisan appeal.  Otherwise 
the vicissitudes of the electorate will not provide the market stability and 
adequate incentives to induce investment in innovation on the scale that is 
needed.  So now is the time to begin. 
The cap-and-trade program embodied in Liberman-Warner is a good 
place to start the transition into a low-carbon economy because it is based 
on markets and probably consistent with WTO rules.  This approach provides 
incentives to move in the right direction and spreads the costs of 
implementing major changes across a large portion of U.S. industry. 
Furthermore, a U.S. cap-and-trade program would build on the progress of 
the WTO in resolving international disputes on trade without having to 
develop a separate enforcement regime as DSBs already have the recognized 
authority to make sovereign governments act or face the threat of economic 
sanctions from other Members.  In contrast, though a performance 
standards approach might offer a temporary respite for a few domestic 
industries, in the long run it increases the costs of halting climate change 
because it is narrower in scope and administratively costly.  Moreover, the 
close association of carbon intensity standards with lax environmental 
policies of the past and present is likely to deter international cooperation 
where it is crucial.  Carbon intensity standards represent the latest in a 
series of ineffective approaches that have enticed policymakers with the 
proposition that the problem can be addressed without any real sacrifice on 
the part of their constituents.  It is time to make a clean break from such 
policies.  American citizens have shown an increasing willingness to make 
some sacrifices in the global fight against climate change if they are evenly 
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shared and produce real results – two outcomes that are least likely to result 
from carbon intensity standards.  
